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ABSTRACT 
 
Firm Ownership, Institutional Environment,  
and Audit Collusion: 
Empirical Evidence from A Transitional Economy 
 
 
By 
 
 
WANG Rui 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
Motivated by the renewed interest in, but insufficient empirical evidence of, 
collusion between auditors and corporate management, I examine this issue in the 
unique environment of China, which is characterized by a high level of government 
control over listed companies and auditors, strong competition for audit clients, and 
uneven economic and legal development across the country. In contrast to prior studies, 
I employ a two-stage regression approach to study the determinants of audit collusion 
in China. In the first stage, I develop an audit opinion prediction model of Big 4 
auditors (viewed as “typical” auditors) that corrects for self-selection bias. I then apply 
this opinion prediction model to clients of non-Big 4 (local) auditors. I define audit 
collusion as the discrepancy between the actual opinions that clients of local auditors 
received and the opinions these clients would have received under similar 
circumstances had they hired typical auditors (i.e., Big 4 auditors): that is, the 
predicted opinions. In the second stage, I regress an audit collusion proxy on client and 
auditor characteristics and institutional variables to detect the determinants of audit 
collusion in China. 
Audit collusion depends on the closeness of the relation among three parties – the 
company owner, the company manager, and the auditor. Prior studies suggest that 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local auditors have the closest relationship and 
that their interests are mostly aligned. As audit qualification and client loss are costly 
for SOE managers and local auditors, respectively, both parties have strong incentives 
to abide by a self-enforcing collusive agreement. Therefore, I expect audit collusion to 
occur in SOEs that demonstrate poor firm performance (which could lead to qualified 
opinions), in listed companies that are characterized by a strong government presence 
and the audit reports of which are subject to government interference, and when 
market forces are not strong enough to deter collusive behavior.  
Using a sample of 4,874 firm-year observations over the 2001-2006 period, I find 
statistically robust evidence to confirm my hypotheses. Specifically, I find that SOEs 
in poor financial condition and for which the government is the largest shareholder 
  
tend to collude with their auditors. In addition, I find that the relation between 
non-SOEs (regardless of their financial condition) and audit collusion to be 
significantly negative, which suggests that the interests of non-SOEs are mostly 
aligned with the interests of individual investors. Consistent with prior studies, I also 
find that audit collusion usually occurs in regions in which the underlying institutional 
features of the market environment are not in place to punish auditors.  
Prior research generally uses auditor switching to test for the existence of 
collusive auditor behavior by comparing observed pre- and post-switch audit opinions. 
As a result, relatively little attention has been paid to the possibility of audit collusion 
in the absence of auditor switching. Moreover, comparison of observed opinions 
before and after companies switch auditors is subject to potential self-selection bias, as 
post-switchers are not randomly assigned to audit firms. The present study overcomes 
these problems by considering all listed companies (regardless of auditor switching) 
and using the two-stage Heckman approach to control for self-selection bias. Further, 
in contrast to most prior research, which uses an analytical model to distinguish honest 
and dishonest auditor reporting, I empirically test collusion by comparing the 
difference between the actual opinions that client firms receive and the opinions they 
would have received had they used independent, higher quality auditors. 
My results suggest that as long as the interests of the company and the auditor 
coincide and neither party has an incentive to break the collusive agreement, audit 
collusion can occur even when auditor switching does not take place. The finding that 
audit collusion exists in China suggests that government rules and regulations alone 
are not sufficient to create a healthy audit market. Rather, the government should 
improve the overall institutional environment through measures such as the reduction 
of government ownership of firms, withdrawal of the government from involvement in 
both the stock and audit markets, and development of a credit market and legal 
environment that deter collusive auditor behavior. 
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Firm Ownership, Institutional Environment, and Audit Collusion:  
Empirical Evidence from A Transitional Economy 
 
1. Introduction 
Many researchers have tried to obtain empirical evidence of auditor independence. 
Most prior research has focused on opinion shopping or audit switching (Ellingsen and 
Frederic, 1986; Chow and Rice, 1982; Smith, 1986; Krishnan, 1994; Krishnan and 
Stephens, 1995; Lennox, 2000), as it is argued that collusive behavior between 
auditors and auditees can be detected only when companies switch auditors. However, 
this point of view is flawed, because the possibility that audit collusion may have 
occurred in the absence of auditor switching has been overlooked. This study aims to 
examine whether collusion exists, and if so, to discover the determinants of audit 
collusion in a transitional economy. I consider both switching and non-switching 
situations. Using China as my testing sample, I find that audit collusion exist in 
China’s capital market. Specifically, I find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
more likely to engage in audit collusion, especially when they are in poor financial 
condition. Whereas state-owned share concentration leads to audit collusion, 
non-state-owned share concentration deters audit collusion because it aligns the 
interests of the largest shareholder with those of the other shareholders and mitigates 
the free-rider problem of small shareholders. Moreover, I find that audit collusion 
tends to occur in regions in which the institutional environment is weak. 
In contrast to previous research methods, which are designed to test opinion 
shopping, I employ a two-stage logit regression to find empirical evidence of audit 
collusion in China’s capital market. In the first stage, I develop an audit opinion 
prediction model of high-quality Big-4 auditors, and introduce a two-step probit/logit 
model to control for self-selection bias between auditees and auditors. Then I apply 
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this audit opinion prediction model from stage one to auditees of China’s local auditors, 
and obtain an audit opinion for each firm in my sample. Audit collusion proxy is 
defined as the discrepancy between the actual opinions that clients received from their 
auditors and the opinions they would have received under similar circumstances from 
a Big-4 auditor (considered a “typical” auditor)1. In the second stage, I regress the 
difference in opinion on client and auditor characteristics and institutional variables to 
detect the determinants of audit collusion in China. 
Following prior studies, which find that China’s local auditors tend to issue 
favorable reports under political pressure (e.g., DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999; Chan, 
Lin, and Mo, 2006), I expect that audit collusion exists in China’s capital market. 
Specifically, I expect the ownership structure of listed firms, firm performance, and 
institutional factors to affect the reporting behavior of auditors, in particular, local 
auditors. I test my hypotheses by analyzing all companies listed on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges during the 2001-2006 period. Consistent with my 
expectations, I find empirical evidence that audit collusion exists in China’s capital 
market. I find that SOEs demonstrating poor financial performance tend to collude 
with their auditors, whereas non-SOEs, regardless of their financial performance, do 
not tend to collude with their auditors. I also find that state-owned share concentration 
leads to audit collusion, and that non-state-owned share concentration deters audit 
collusion to some extent. Similar to the results of prior studies (e.g., Wang, Wong, and 
Xia, 2005), my results show that audit collusion usually occurs in regions that have an 
undeveloped market with strong government interference and relatively poor legal 
enforcement.     
                                                        
1  This proxy follows the study by Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1987), which indicates that audit 
qualification prediction model can serve as a benchmark to represent the probability that a “typical” auditor would 
issue a qualified opinion under similar circumstances. This benchmark would be useful in peer review committees, 
in debates about “opinion shopping”, in quality control procedures within firms, and in court cases involving 
auditor negligence for not issuing qualified opinions. 
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This paper contributes to the existing literature on audit opinion prediction and 
audit collusion. First, I contribute to the audit collusion literature by providing 
empirical evidence of the relation between ownership structure and audit collusion. I 
find that SOEs have a self-enforcing side contract with their auditors, and that these 
firms are more likely to take part in audit collusion. State-owned share concentration 
leads to audit collusion, whereas non-state-owned share concentration mitigates the 
free-rider problem of other shareholders and therefore deters audit collusion. In 
addition, I test the effect of institutional environment on audit collusion. Consistent 
with the existing literature, I find that audit collusion is more likely to occur in regions 
that have a poor institutional environment. Second, I introduce a two-step probit/logit 
model to control for self-selection bias between auditees and auditors in the audit 
opinion prediction model, which is the first such model in the audit opinion prediction 
literature and proves to be a prediction model with high precision of classification. 
Further, I employ in my model a proxy for audit collusion, which is defined as the 
discrepancy between the actual opinions that clients received from their auditors and 
the opinions they would have received under similar circumstances from a “typical” 
auditor. This collusion proxy enables the empirical testing of audit collusion theories, 
unlike the case of traditional analytical models, and sheds light on the generation of 
other proxies for collusion in organizations.  
The present study extends and complements the study of Chan, Lin, and Mo (2006) 
on audit quality in one important dimension. Whereas the main aim of the latter study 
was to examine whether auditor opinions are affected by government political and 
economic influences during the 1996-2002 period, the main aim of this study is to test 
for the existence and determinants of audit collusion during the 2001-2006 period. To 
the best of my knowledge, the present study is the first to provide empirical evidence 
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of audit collusion in a transitional economy. Chan, Lin, and Mo (2006) find that local 
auditors are more economically dependent on local clients and subject to greater 
political influence from local governments than are non-local auditors, and are 
inclined to issue favorable reports for local government-owned companies to mitigate 
probable economic losses. I find that only SOEs demonstrating poor financial 
performance collude with their auditors, whereas non-SOEs, regardless of their 
financial performance, have little incentive to collude with local auditors. I also 
provide a direct test to show the relationships among ownership structure, institutional 
environment, and audit collusion, and find that state-owned share concentration leads 
significantly to audit collusion, whereas non-state-owned share concentration deters 
audit collusion. Further, my results show that audit collusion usually occurs in regions 
that have an undeveloped market with strong government interference and relatively 
poor legal enforcement. 
This study has policy implications for both regulators and practitioners. The 
finding that audit collusion exists in China suggests that government rules and 
regulations alone are not sufficient to create a healthy audit market. Rather, the 
government should improve the overall institutional environment through measures 
such as the reduction of government ownership of firms, withdrawal of the 
government from involvement in both the stock and audit markets, and development 
of the legal environment.  
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. The literature review and 
hypotheses development are presented in the second section. The third section 
includes the method and research design, which consists of the sample description and 
data collection, a two-stage regression model involving an audit opinion prediction 
model using capital market and firm-specific financial data, and a logit regression to 
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ascertain the determinants of audit collusion in China’s capital market. The empirical 
results and robustness tests are presented in the fourth section, and the conclusions are 
given in the fifth section. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Audit Collusion 
Audit collusion is defined as the fraudulent behavior that occurs when an auditor 
accepts a favor from the client, loses his or her professional independence, provides an 
unfair and biased audit report, and issues the client an unwarranted favorable audit 
opinion to meet the client’s special needs. In a traditional auditing model with adverse 
selection and unobservable effort, a principal, the owner of the resources, hires an 
auditor to monitor the agent who manages and acts on the principal’s behalf in order to 
overcome information asymmetry. The agent usually has private information about the 
true operation and performance of the firm and can use it to seek rents from the 
principal for the agent’s own benefit. Here, the auditor’s task is to verify the agent’s 
statement by issuing a fair and unbiased audit report. The transferred information that 
the principal receives is based on both the agent’s claim and the auditor’s verification 
of the agent’s claim.  
A collusive agreement between an agent and auditor must be self-enforcing, that 
is, neither the agent nor the auditor has an incentive to break the collusive agreement 
when the counterpart does not do so (Baiman, Evans, and Nagarajan, 1991). A 
fraudulent agent (the manager) has a strong incentive to bribe the auditor, but an 
honest auditor will refuse the bribe and report the manager’s offer of a bribe. In this 
scenario, the fraudulent agent is punished, and the honest auditor receives only the 
audit fee offered by the principal. A dishonest auditor, however, will take the agent’s 
bribe, help mask the agent’s misbehavior, and issue a favorable report that supports the 
agent’s claim. In this scenario, the interests of the auditor and those of the agent are in 
alignment. They make a side contract that is self-enforcing because both of the two 
will be better off compared with the first scenario: the agent will use information rent 
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extracted from the principal for the agent’s private use, and the auditor will get the 
audit fee offered by the principal as well as the bribe the agent offered for colluding. 
Kofman and Lawarree (1993) were the first to develop an analytical model to 
distinguish honest from dishonest auditors. Most prior studies of audit collusion have 
used analytical models of collusive behavior. However, very little empirical evidence 
on audit collusion exists, because the decision whether or not to collude reflects a state 
of mind and is not a permanent feature, and because the decision to collude can depend 
on the different incentives faced by the auditor. Some researchers link collusive 
behavior to auditor switching, as companies are free to select different auditors until 
they find one who is willing to sacrifice his or her professional ethics for commercial 
gain by participating in improper accounting practices (Ellingsen and Frederick, 1986). 
Empirical evidence of opinion shopping is at best mixed, as different research methods 
are employed. Chow and Rice (1982) find that companies are more likely to switch 
auditors after receiving qualified opinions than after receiving unqualified opinions, 
but they are no more likely to receive unqualified opinions in the year after switching 
than are other non-switching companies. Smith (1986) conducts a case analysis and 
reports that only five out of 139 companies are suspected of opinion shopping. 
Krishnan (1994) finds that switchers receive conservative treatment relative to 
non-switching clients. He points out that the receipt of conservative treatment, rather 
than the receipt of qualified opinions, motivates auditor switching. Krishnan and 
Stephens (1995) cannot find an example of successful opinion shopping, and attribute 
this to the conservative treatment of switchers by both predecessor and successor 
auditors. In contrast, Lennox (2000) finds empirical evidence of successful opinion 
shopping in the U.K. He predicts the opinions that companies would have received had 
they made opposite switching decisions. He finds that companies would have received 
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unfavorable reports more often under different switching decisions, and interprets his 
finding as evidence of successful opinion shopping. 
The methods adopted in prior research are all based on the assumption that 
auditors’ collusive behavior is unidentifiable from alternative sources, and that opinion 
shopping detection must focus on the relation between the audit opinion and auditor 
switching. However, this assumption is inadequate, as it does not consider the situation 
in which the threat to switch results in the issuance of favorable opinions. That is, 
favorable opinions are not necessarily a result of auditor switching. Non-switchers can 
receive favorable opinions by threatening to switch to a new auditor. The shocking 
audit scandal of Arthur Andersen and Enron was revealed in December 2001. The 
management and the auditor of these two giants in their respective industries took 
advantage of not only investors, but also the government and public as a whole, to 
illegally increase their personal wealth. Arthur Andersen had been Enron’s auditor 
ever since Enron’s foundation in 1985, and did not execute its duties independently 
because of the huge amount of audit and consulting fees that Enron provided. A 
similar case occurred in China. The CPA firm of Zhongtianqin (中天勤) was one of the 
leading accounting firms in China prior to 2000. As the auditor of Yinguangxia (银广
夏 ) for seven consecutive years, Zhongtianqin assisted the client in fabricating 
financial reports but issued clean audit reports. These cases indicate that companies 
can get a favorable audit opinion without having to switch auditors. 
More evidence comes from financial reporting enforcement. Financial reporting 
enforcement is an external monitoring process that is intended to strengthen investors’ 
confidence in the accuracy of financial statements. China’s regulatory authorities may 
take supervisory measures such as ordering a company to publish the errors that have 
been identified in order to serve the public interest. For example, from 1997 to 2005, 
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the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges required financial reporting of 101 and 
124 listed firms, respectively, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) required financial reporting of another 308 listed firms. During the same 
period of time, there were only 138 voluntary auditor changes (Chan, Lin, and Zhang, 
2007). Although I assume that some of these 138 firms engaged in opinion shopping, it 
is still a small proportion relative to the total number of firms that had questionable 
financial statements and thus were required to comply with regulatory norms by stock 
exchanges and the regulatory authority (101+124+308). This further illustrates that 
auditor switching may not be a good indicator of audit collusion. Therefore, prior 
empirical research on audit opinion shopping and audit collusion is incomplete. 
Although many noted papers have found evidence of opinion shopping, very few find 
evidence of collusive behavior between firms and auditors without auditor switching, 
because the possibility that threatening to switch auditors may result in the issuance of 
favorable audit opinions has been neglected.  
2.2. Auditor-Client Self-Enforcing Side Contract and Audit Collusion 
    Although Chinese investors may perceive auditors to be more objective and more 
neutral than the managers of SOEs, auditors have been found to collude with managers 
in manipulating financial statements (Lei, 2005). To explain why Chinese auditors lose 
their independence, a thorough understanding of the development of CPA firms in 
China is necessary. In 1979, China undertook a revolutionary economic reform by 
decentralizing SOEs, and began to attract foreign direct investment. Since then, the 
Chinese government has realized the importance of external auditors for the healthy 
development of the stock markets, which were established in the early 1990s. To 
ensure audit quality, the central government granted permission to selected accounting 
firms to audit listed companies. Because of the lack of capital, most audit firms were 
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affiliated with local governments or government agencies. Government-affiliated 
audit firms once dominated the audit market with 75% of shares in terms of numbers 
of clients (DeFond et al., 1999). Sponsoring government agencies such as finance 
bureaus, tax bureaus, bureaus in charge of different industries, or other local 
government agencies often demanded that companies located within their 
administrative territory be audited by their sponsored audit firms (Yang et al., 2001). 
As a result, auditor judgment and the type of audit report issued were often affected by 
the sponsoring local government agencies (Tang, 1999; Zhong, 1998), which severely 
compromised auditor independence in China and led to a disaffiliation campaign in 
1997. However, this campaign could not change the fact that most listed companies are 
primarily owned by local governments, and the majority of local audit firms was 
previously affiliated and had close connections with these governments (DeFond, 
Wong, and Li, 1999; Tang, 1999; Yang, Tang, Kilgore, and Hong, 2001). Although 
presently the audit firms appear to be independent and have no further connection with 
local governments, private relationships (called guanxi in Chinese) still exist among 
former colleagues and departments, and local governments can still exert influence on 
audit firms in their jurisdictions through regulations administered by their finance 
bureaus, audit bureaus, and local audit institutes (Tang, 1999; Zhong, 1998). These 
audit firms are also dependent on the political influence of local government to acquire 
more SOE clients, which is critical for an audit firm’s survival in the fiercely 
competitive audit market. Hence, auditors who have greater economic dependence on 
local clients and are subject to more political influence from local governments are 
inclined to report favorably on SOEs to mitigate probable economic losses (Chan, Lin, 
and Mo, 2006). Chan and Mo (2002) point out that respect for and obedience to local 
authorities is important for maintaining good business relationships in China. 
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    Auditors in China have an undeniable incentive to collude with their SOE clients, 
which are economically very important clients. An audit firm faces potential economic 
losses if it follows professional criteria and issues reports that are unfavorable to its 
SOE clients. Meanwhile, as the dominant shareholder of SOEs, the local government 
will be impressed by an auditor’s willingness to collude in preparing false financial 
reports, and hence may refer more SOE clients to that audit firm. However, SOE 
managers do not have market-based incentives to demand high-quality auditors 
(DeFond, Wong and Li, 1999). In China, companies with modified reports must 
explain the nature and underlying reasons for the receipt of a modified report directly 
to the CSRC (Chen, Su, and Zhao, 2000). Therefore, SOE managers have a strong 
incentive to avoid modified audit opinions, which will probably bring them future 
political and economic costs.  
In this two-party game, auditors are generally considered to be “subordinates” and 
SOEs to be “superiors” because of the power of SOEs to hire and fire auditors. In 
dealing with subordinates, superiors often adopt a take-it-or-leave-it attitude. 
Following the receipt of an unfavorable audit opinion in one year, some SOEs may 
continue changing auditors in the following years until they finally find an auditor who 
is willing to report leniently. Initial evidence shows that a successor auditor is more 
cooperative and more likely to express a clean opinion (Li and Wu, 2002). DeFond, 
Wong, and Li (1999) find that the top 10 audit firms, which are more professional and 
independent, lose their market shares as a result of issuing modified audit opinions. As 
illustrated above, SOEs exert strong political pressure on local auditors, and auditors 
have incentives to report favorably to obtain greater economic benefits and political 
protection. Hence, SOEs and local auditors have established collusive self-enforcing 
contracts. The severe shortage of qualified accountants and auditors in China further 
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hinders the development of professional auditing (Winkle et al., 1994; Graham, 1996). 
Without an independent audit profession, any information provided by the auditor as a 
third party assurance will be biased and hence unreliable. 
    In conclusion, SOEs exert strong political pressure on local auditors, and local 
auditors have incentives to issue favorable reports for their SOE clients. Both SOEs 
and local auditors are inclined to take part in audit collusion for their own benefit. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that only SOEs with inferior financial performance 
have strong incentives to collude with their auditors, whereas SOEs with superior 
financial performance lack incentives to do so. Schwartz and Menon (1985) find that 
failing firms have a greater tendency to switch auditors than do healthier firms, while 
Lennox (2000) finds that companies strategically appoint auditors who are less likely 
to issue going concern opinions and that failing companies successfully engage in 
opinion shopping. However, non-SOEs have little ability to exert political pressure on 
their auditors, and they will not take part in audit collusion. Hence, the first hypothesis 
is stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: SOEs demonstrating inferior financial performance are more likely to 
take part in audit collusion, whereas non-SOEs and SOEs demonstrating superior 
financial performance are less likely to take part in audit collusion. 
2.3. Share Concentration and Audit Collusion 
    Concentrated share holdings enable control rights to match cash flow rights. Given 
the amount of investment of large shareholders in a company, it is reasonable to expect 
that they have strong incentives to monitor and discipline management to maximize 
their benefits. The prior literature indicates that large shareholders tend to perform an 
active role in corporate governance. For example, Franks and Mayer (2000) find that 
in Germany, family-owned enterprises usually possess a large amount of shares 
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through a pyramid structure, which enables the ultimate shareholders to have control 
rights over the firm, but these large shareholders hold the shares only for the purpose 
of controlling the firm. In addition, a strong relationship between board turnover and 
poor firm performance has been found in German firms with concentrated ownership, 
and has also been well documented in firms in other Anglo-Saxon countries (Franks 
and Mayer, 2000). Yafeh and Yosha (2003) point out that large shareholders tend to 
constrain managers’ excessive spending on projects that promote the managers’ 
interests but are not in line with the interests of the majority shareholders. Because the 
free-rider problem associated with monitoring is mitigated under concentrated 
ownership, Yafeh and Yosha (2003) argue that large shareholders tend to reduce 
discretionary spending, such as advertisement expenditure. Moreover, large 
shareholders usually combine their general interest in profit maximization and control 
over the profit-making assets of the firm to have their interest respected (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), and they are likely to desire a high-quality audit report and avoid 
collusive behavior for the benefit of both the company and themselves. 
One fundamental problem is that large shareholders will use their control rights to 
maximize the company welfare only when the interests of large shareholders agree 
with the interests of other shareholders. Large shareholders will probably expropriate 
the interests of other shareholders if their personal goals are not consistent with those 
of the other shareholders. For instance, government-owned enterprises tend not to 
have profitability as their sole objective but rather have multiple objectives. Large 
shareholders may view the acquisition of political capital and the development of their 
personal relationship network as more important than profit. This phenomenon 
prevails in many transitional economies such as China, India, and Vietnam because of 
their relatively undeveloped economies and immature capital markets. 
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In China, local governments regard listed SOEs as very precious shell resources. 
First, the number of listed SOEs of a region is not only a symbol of the economic 
prosperity of that region, but also represents the political achievements of the local 
government. Therefore, politicians may care more about increasing the number of 
listed firms in their region, which can enhance their chance of promotion, rather than 
raising more capital (Li and Zhou, 2005). Being de-listed not only incurs economic 
losses in the region, but also brings disgrace to the local government (Chen, Su, and 
Zhao, 2000). Second, local governments often impose policy burdens on the listed 
firms such as infrastructure development to provide relief for the region’s fiscal and 
unemployment problems (Lin, Cai, and Li, 1998). A common strategy that a local 
government often adopts is to use its authority to push the most profitable SOEs or 
their subsidiaries to be listed. Once the enterprise is listed, the government will exert 
political influence to maintain this valuable listed shell resource. The profit that listed 
SOEs generate in the capital market can be transferred to unlisted SOEs or related 
parties, a process usually referred to as “tunneling,” to help avoid the bankruptcy of 
unlisted SOEs or related parties, since the collapse of an SOE can cause widespread 
unemployment and social disharmony. Third, to raise capital through a rights offering, 
listed companies are required to report a return on equity (ROE) greater than or equal 
to 10% for at least three consecutive years. Furthermore, a company will be de-listed if 
it reports a negative ROE for three consecutive years (Haw et al., 2005). As these 
accounting numbers can be easily manipulated through the opportunistic use of 
accounting accruals, local governments have strong incentives to direct management 
to report earnings that meet the requirements. To do so, the local governments need to 
select an auditor who will not challenge such reporting (Aharony et al., 2000; DeFond 
et al., 1999). The extant literature indicates that when the large shareholder is the 
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government, the interest that the large shareholder pursues is different from that of the 
other shareholders, which is the maximization of their wealth. As large shareholders of 
SOEs have incentives to expropriate other shareholders in order to meet their specific 
political goals, they are more like to collude with obedient auditors to cover this 
expropriation. 
Hence, I expect that share concentration leads to audit collusion when the 
interests of large shareholders do not coincide with the interests of other shareholders. 
Specifically, if large shareholders are private investors (e.g., institutional 
shareholders), their goal is to maximize profit in the most efficient way, and thus they 
need high-quality auditors to verify financial data in order to reduce information 
asymmetry. Share concentration in the hands of private, institutional investors is likely 
to deter audit collusion. However, if the large shareholders are local governments, they 
will have multiple goals that have little to do with profit maximization. Large 
shareholders of SOEs require obedient auditors who will abandon their professional 
ethics and issue favorable audit opinions in order to mask the expropriation of other 
shareholders by the large shareholders. Therefore, I hypothesize that share 
concentration of SOEs in the hands of local governments will result in audit collusion. 
The more shares are owned by the government, the more likely the SOEs will take part 
in audit collusion. Therefore, the following hypothesis regarding share concentration 
and audit collusion is proposed. 
Hypothesis 2: Share concentration in SOEs leads to audit collusion, whereas share 
concentration in non-SOEs deters audit collusion. 
2.4. Institutional Environment and Audit Collusion 
A few studies point out that financial reporting quality is influenced by the 
political environment (Bushman et al., 2004; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Ball et 
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al., 2000), and that SOEs tend to choose low-quality auditors in regions characterized 
by a poor institutional environment for ease of collusion (Wang, Wong, and Xia, 2005). 
Three aspects of institutional environment are considered here: the degree of 
government involvement in the economy, the capital market development in a specific 
administrative region, and the degree of shareholder protection, or legal enforcement. 
Little direct evidence has been found of the relation between audit collusion and 
institutional environment. That is, few papers have explored whether audit collusion is 
more likely to occur in regions with a poor institutional environment, whether SOEs 
behave differently from non-SOEs in the same institutional environment in terms of 
audit collusion, or whether a good institutional environment deters the formation of a 
collusive self-enforcing contract between SOEs and tractable auditors.  
Since the launch of the economic decentralization reform in 1978, China’s central 
government has relaxed its absolute control over the allocation of economic resources 
to local governments, and granted local governments more autonomy to promote 
economic growth in their administrative region. Because of the different endeavors of 
local governments and different locations that create different opportunities for 
economic development, a great heterogeneity across provinces in terms of 
marketization and institutional quality exists in China’s capital market (Wang, Wong, 
and Xia, 2005). Therefore, China provides a unique setting for testing the effect of the 
institutional environment on audit collusion within one country. Following prior 
studies, I expect that collusion is associated with a weak institutional environment, and 
that audit collusion is more likely to occur in regions in which the local governments 
have a high degree of involvement in the economy, the credit market is 
underdeveloped, and legal protection of minority shareholder interests is relatively low. 
As mentioned earlier, unlike non-state owners, local governments have incentives to 
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use SOEs as platforms to fulfill their political goals, such as upgrading their 
administrative ranking, reducing the regional unemployment rate, and tunneling 
profits to help other SOEs in the same region avoid bankruptcy. Local auditors are 
influenced by political pressure from local governments and economically dependent 
on their SOE clients. As a result, they often have to issue favorable reports for their 
SOE clients in order to survive in the highly competitive audit market. This kind of 
self-enforcing side contract is very common among China’s auditors and SOEs. Wang, 
Wong, and Xia (2005) find that auditors are more lenient only towards SOEs, and not 
towards non-state-owned firms. They argue that local governments may use political 
power to undermine the independence of auditors and force auditors to take part in 
collusion. Hence, I expect that as non-SOEs have no ability to exert political pressure 
on their auditors, auditors will not collude with their non-SOE clients regardless of the 
kind of institutional environment in which their clients operate. Therefore, the third 
hypothesis is as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: Audit collusion is more likely to occur in regions with a poor 
institutional environment than in regions with a good institutional environment, and 
SOEs are less likely to collude with their auditors in regions with a good institutional 
environment than with those in regions with a poor institutional environment. 
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3. Research Method 
3.1. Data Collection 
The China Securities Markets and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database is the 
primary source of financial information on the listed companies that issued A shares in 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Stock market data and audit opinion type 
are acquired from the Wind database. Information related to audit firms such as firm 
location and auditor identity are collected from the official Web site of the Chinese 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA). 2  Corporate governance 
information of listed companies is obtained from the China Center for Economic 
Research (CCER) database. To be retained in my sample, firms must have complete 
financial and audit information for hypothesis testing. Financial institutions and 
insurance companies are excluded from the sample because their business and 
financial reporting requirements are different from those of other listed companies. 
The observations of firms that are located in Tibet are also excluded because three 
regional institutional indices are not available for Tibet. In addition, I trim off the 
outliers that fall outside three standard deviations from the mean to get rid of extreme 
values. Panel A of Table 1 shows that my sample consists of 5,268 firm-year 
observations of Chinese listed companies over the 2001-2006 period.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Although the number of firms that are included in the sample increases annually, 
the proportion of Big 4 auditees to non-Big 4 auditees is roughly the same for each 
year. SOEs account for a very large portion of my sample, reaching the highest 
percentage of all firms in 2001 (84.62%) and the lowest percentage in 2006 (67.60%), 
                                                        
2 The official Web site for the CICPA is www.cicpa.org.cn  
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which is consistent with the fact that most listed companies in China’s capital market 
are ultimately controlled by the government. Panel B presents the client composition 
of two types of auditors during the sample period. The table shows that 84% of Big 4 
clients and 75% of non-Big 4 clients are owned by the government. Again, SOEs 
account for a great proportion of auditors’ clients, and auditors in China have a heavy 
economic dependence on their SOE clients. Panel C of Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics on the frequencies of clean versus modified audit opinions that Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 auditors issued during the sample period. DeFond, Wong, and Li (1999) 
point out that large auditors have the greatest propensity to issue modified reports. 
However, panel C indicates that, on average, Big 4 auditors issued significantly fewer 
modified auditor opinions than did non-Big 4 auditors (6.09% vs. 9.66%, respectively). 
One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that Big 4 auditors usually serve large 
clients that are in better financial condition and have better internal control, and as a 
result, their clients are less likely to be issued qualified opinions. This discrepancy in 
the number of modified opinions also indicates that auditees are not randomly 
assigned to their auditors and that they select auditors according to firm characteristics, 
such as financial condition, corporate governance, and institutional factors. The 
variable definitions and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2 in panel A and 
panel B, respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive information of client firm characteristics divided 
by class of auditor. ANOVA F-statistics for equality of means and the Wilcoxon test of 
differences in medians are employed. The last column shows that most of the variables 
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that denote firm characteristics are significantly different between Big 4 and non-Big 4 
groups. For example, firms with a higher current ratio, higher return of equity, and 
lower receivables and inventory ratios tend to select Big 4 auditors, whereas firms that 
received a modified audit opinion in previous years or are currently experiencing 
losses tend to choose non-Big 4 auditors. In addition, firms located in regions with a 
poor institutional environment are more likely to select non-Big 4 auditors, whereas 
firms that have an internal audit committee are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors. 
These comparisons between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditees indicate that auditors are not 
randomly allocated to listed firms; rather, firms probably self-select auditors according 
to their firm characteristics.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.2. Model Specifications 
3.2.1. Stage One: Audit Opinion Prediction Model 
Researchers use different methods to predict audit uncertainty qualifications. 
Beaver (1966) employs a univariate approach using a paired classification technique to 
predict failure on the basis of financial ratios. Altman (1968) uses multi-discriminant 
analysis to predict failure. Castagna and Matolcsy (1981) develop a quadratic 
discriminant analysis technique to examine the predictive ability of selected financial 
ratios to discriminate between failed and surviving companies. Mutchler (1985) and 
Bell and Tabor (1991) use financial variables to develop auditors’ going-concern 
evaluations of firms. Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1987) introduce capital 
market variables to the prediction model and estimate the type of audit opinion based 
on both financial and market variables. Chen, Marshall, Zhang, and Ganesh (2006) 
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predict the financial distress of companies in China. They argue that the logit model is 
the optimal prediction model with the best classification ability. 
These approaches, although straightforward, rely on at least three implicit 
assumptions. First, the opinion prediction model assumes that Big 4 and non-Big 4 
auditors use the same audit structure when issuing audit opinions. This assumption can 
be restrictive, as it does not allow for interactive effects between auditor type and firm 
characteristics and ignores differences in the demand for Big 4 auditors. Studies 
indicate that Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors report differently in China’s capital market. 
Political pressure from the local government has little influence on Big 4 auditors. 
DeFond, Wong, and Li (1999) point out that Big 4 auditors usually serve the clients 
that demand higher quality audit reports. Hence, Big 4 auditors issue independent 
reports in China’s auditing market. Chan, Lin, and Mo (2006) find that local auditors, 
who have greater economic dependence on local clients and are subject to more 
political pressure from local governments than non-local auditors, are inclined to 
report favorably on local government-owned enterprises to mitigate probable 
economic losses. Second, the underlying assumption of the traditional audit opinion 
prediction model is that auditors’ decision rules do not vary with the institutional 
environment. Fan and Wang (2003) provide evidence that institutional development is 
not uniform across the China. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) show that accounting 
standards are not the only determinant of reporting behavior, and that economic and 
political variables profoundly affect financial reporting practice. Hence, it is 
reasonable to argue that auditors will adjust their decision rules based on the 
institutional environment of the region in which their clients operate. Finally, and most 
importantly, the model implicitly assumes that auditors are randomly allocated to 
client firms. However, as suggested by Copley et al. (1995) and Ireland and Lennox 
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(2002), auditor choice is likely to be endogenous. Because client firms are not 
randomly assigned to audit firms, it is probable that firms self-select Big 4 or non-Big 
4 auditors based on firm characteristics, private information, and/or other 
unobservable characteristics.  
Theoretical studies (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Datar et al., 1991) use signaling 
models to explore the self-selection of auditors by clients, and there is a common 
perception that clients self-select their auditors. From an econometric perspective, 
self-selection introduces a bias in the logit audit opinion prediction model. To address 
this point more specifically, consider the following equation: 
Auditor choice equation: iii uZ4Big +=α         (1) 
Audit opinion prediction model: i0i0i0 vXOpinion += β  if 04 =iBig   (2) 
     i1i1i1 vXOpinion += β  if 1=iBig４ ,  (3) 
where iX and iZ are vectors of the exogenous variables and the error terms, iu , i0v , 
and i1v are assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero. The 
variance-covariance matrix is given by 
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Standard logit regressions of audit opinion prediction models are potentially 
misspecified. To show this, take the conditional expectations of the residuals in 
equations (2) and (3), respectively: 
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where the functions φ  and Φ  are the standard normal probability density 
function and the cumulative distribution function, respectively; u0σ  and u1σ  are the 
covariance of the residuals from the non-Big 4 and Big 4 audit opinion prediction 
regressions, respectively, and the residuals from the auditor choice equation. In the 
above equations, if 0u0 ≠σ or 0u1 ≠σ , then the conditional expectation is nonzero, 
causing the logit regression to be misspecified and the estimated coefficients to be 
biased. Although researchers can directly control for many client characteristics, 
characteristics that are not observable to them may affect both audit opinion issuance 
and auditor choice and thereby cause bias. Ireland and Lennox (2002) point out that 
the quality of internal accounting controls and management integrity are potentially 
important characteristics that are unobservable to researchers. Studies indicate that 
companies with strong internal control and superior management integrity are more 
likely to choose high-quality auditors (Thornton and Moore, 1993), and that they are 
more likely to get unqualified audit opinions. These unobservable client characteristics 
affect both auditor choice ( iu ) and audit opinion issuance ( iv ), and make 0)vu(E ii ≠ , 
that is, 0u0 ≠σ  and 0u1 ≠σ . Therefore, standard logit regressions of audit opinion 
prediction models are potentially misspecified and the estimated coefficients are 
biased.   
Heckman (1979) derives a two-step method to correct for selectivity bias in linear 
regression models with normal errors, and Dubin and Rivers (1989) apply the same 
basic conceptual framework to logit and probit models, and develop a  two-stage 
binary probit method to control for self-selection bias in discrete-choice models. 
Following prior studies, I introduce the probit/logit two-stage method to control for 
selection effects. First, I estimate a probit auditor selection model and use the results to 
generate the inverse Mills ratios. Next, I include the inverse Mills ratios in audit 
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opinion prediction models for the clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors to correct for 
selectivity bias. The estimated coefficients of audit opinion prediction models will be 
biased if the inverse Mills ratios are omitted from the regression. The self-selection 
model is given as follows. 
Auditor Choice:  
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The descriptive statistics and definitions of these variables given above are 
presented in Table 2. Consistent with previous research, I expect that client firm 
characteristics, firm private information, and institutional factors affect both auditor 
choice and audit opinion issuance.  
(i) Variables Included in Both the Auditor Choice and Opinion Prediction Model 
Financial variables, that is, total assets, current ratio, leverage, return on equity 
(ROE), and current year loss, are included to reflect the financial condition of the firms. 
The literature indicates that these variables are successful in predicting firm financial 
distress (Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1987). I expect that firms with larger 
assets and a higher current ratio and ROE are in good financial condition. Similarly, I 
expect low-leverage firms to be less close to bankruptcy and hence they are less likely 
to be issued qualified opinions. The ratios of receivables and inventory to total assets 
are considered as they may capture an auditor’s potential exposure to litigation risk. St. 
Pierre and Anderson (1984) survey accounting and auditing disputes in 130 lawsuits 
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against auditors and find a high frequency of suits involving inventory and receivables. 
These variables suggest that a qualified audit opinion is more likely if a firm is in poor 
financial condition. Therefore, I expect firms in good financial condition with lower 
litigation risk to be more likely to receive a clean audit opinion and hence they may 
self-select Big 4 auditors to signal the market. 
Prior studies find that the type of audit opinion is highly persistent (Lennox, 2000), 
that is, if a firm is issued a qualified opinion by its auditor in one year, it is more likely 
to receive a qualified audit opinion in the following year. Usually, auditor change and 
interactions with the previous audit opinion significantly influence the successor 
auditor’s opinion. In the logit model, a dummy variable representing the prior year’s 
audit opinion is included to measure the auditor’s concern with the firm’s overall 
performance. I expect that when a firm is issued a modified opinion in one year, it is 
more likely to be issued a qualified opinion in the following year. To avoid receiving 
another qualified opinion, the firm is likely to switch from a high-quality auditor to a 
low-quality auditor. Since 1992, some listed companies in China have been authorized 
to issue B shares, which are denominated in foreign currencies to foreign investors. 
These companies are required to prepare an additional set of financial statements for 
foreign investors according to International Accounting Standards (IAS). Companies 
with foreign ownership are generally larger and there is greater demand for quality 
financial reports from foreign owners; these companies also have incentives to hire 
high-quality auditors (DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999). Hence, a B-share variable is used 
to control for the confounding effect of differential demand for quality financial 
information (Chan, Lin, and Mo, 2006).  
Stock market variables are included as potential determinants of auditor choice 
and audit qualification decision (Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1987) for two 
 - 26 -    
reasons. First, market return measures capture information above and beyond that 
reported in financial statements. Good news, such as unrealized gains, potential 
investment opportunities, or a successful outcome from R&D, and bad news, such as 
possible litigation involvement and loss of market share due to outdated technology, 
cannot be reflected in financial statements, but can be forecasted by analysts and 
sophisticated investors and reflected in stock prices. Market return measures may be 
correlated with the auditor’s information set, or the auditor may use market return 
measures to infer information incorporated in market prices. Ohlson (1980) argues that 
stock market variables improve the predictive ability of financial distress prediction 
models. Beaver (1968) suggests that changes in stock price are more timely predictors 
of bankruptcy than are univariate financial statement variables. Chen et al. (2006) 
introduced capital market value in the financial distress prediction model in China. 
Following these literature, I use a firm-specific beta calculated from the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) model to proxy market return and expect it to be positively 
related with choosing a Big 4 auditor and getting a clean audit opinion. I expect that 
the higher the firm market return, the more likely is the firm to choose a Big 4 auditor, 
and the more likely the firm will get a clean audit report. Second, stock price 
fluctuation can capture information about the firm’s future performance; however, 
conflicting interpretations coexist of the expected sign of fluctuation. Lawsuits against 
auditors usually take place after the value of the equity falls precipitously because 
plaintiffs need only to establish reliance on financial statements that did not disclose 
major uncertainties. The greater the fluctuation of a firm’s returns, the higher is the 
probability of a large decline in stock price. Nevertheless, a huge positive fluctuation 
can also demonstrate soaring performance, and firms with huge positive fluctuations 
have incentives to self-select Big 4 auditors to verify their financial reports and send a 
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positive signal to the capital market. Therefore, a variable, Fluctuations, which equals 
the standard deviation of stock prices, is included in the logit model to capture the 
uncertainty of earnings. The expected coefficient of Fluctuations is mixed. 
The difficulty of the audit engagement may be due to the complexity of the 
specific client, but it may also be a function of the complexity of the client industry (St. 
Pierre and Anderson, 1984). Specific industry audit guides attest to the fact that 
industries are differentially complex. Warren (1980) finds that the incidence of 
qualified opinions is a function of the industry group. In the audit opinion prediction 
model, I introduce the deviation between firm returns and industry average returns to 
control for different environments due to different industries. I use the CSRC industry 
classification system, which comprises twelve categories, to measure industry effect. 
The finance and insurance industry is excluded in the logit regression because there 
are great differences in operating and reporting between the finance and insurance 
industry and other industries. I also control for year effects for both auditor choice and 
audit opinion issuance to account for changes in the macroeconomic environment.  
In contrast to prior studies, I introduce three institutional indices to measure 
institutional heterogeneity across different administrative regions across China 3 
(Wang, Wong, and Xia, 2005). The government involvement index is based on 
government spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), the size of 
SOEs in a province, and the number of government administrative regulations. The 
market index is a measurement of credit market development, which is calculated by 
the percentage of deposits taken by non-state financial institutions and the percentage 
of short-term loans to the non-state sector. Finally, the legal environment index is 
                                                        
3 These three indices, which consist of credit market index, government market involvement index and legal 
environment index, are based on the China’s marketization data in 2002 by Fan and Wang (2003). The regression in 
the model uses provincial rankings for institution heterogeneity. The latest version of China’s marketization report 
is based on data in 2005. Nevertheless, Fan and Wang indicate that there are no significantly marketization changes 
in terms of provincial rankings. 
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measured by the number of lawyers as a percentage of the population in the region. 
The number of lawyers is a proxy for a region’s legal environment. These indices are 
shown in Appendix 1. Rank transformation of the sum of the three institutional indices 
is adopted in both the auditor choice and audit opinion prediction models. Following 
the literature, in which differences in institutional environment are associated with 
variation in financial reporting quality, and specifically, economies with more 
market-oriented characteristics, including stronger professional accounting bodies and 
higher expected litigation costs, are associated with better reporting quality (Ball, 
Robin, and Wu, 2003), I expect a good institutional environment to result in demand 
for higher quality auditors.  
(ii) Variables Included Only in the Auditor Choice Model  
The self-selection model can be estimated only if it satisfies the identification 
condition, which requires that vectors iX  and iZ  have elements that are not in 
common. The variable In_Audit, which is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
listed firm has an internal audit committee, fulfills this role. 
I expect that the existence of an internal audit committee is positively related with 
choosing a Big 4 auditor for at least two reasons. First, firms that choose to establish an 
internal audit committee are inclined to have better management integrity and internal 
control systems. A good internal control environment can act as a guarantee of 
high-quality financial information. It is reasonable to assume that firms with an 
internal audit committee have the ability and motivation to produce higher quality 
financial reports. Second, if the audit committee carries out its duties well, firms have 
the confidence to invite high-quality auditors to verify their financial reports. This 
voluntary selection of Big 4 auditors will send a positive signal to the capital market, 
and distinguish the firms from other firms. 
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(iii) Variables Included Only in the Audit Opinion Prediction Model  
The inverse Mills ratio is included in the audit opinion prediction model. This 
controls for the fact that I do not observe the audit opinion companies would have 
received if they had chosen audit firms of alternative size. To be specific, the 
coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio of the Big 4 group tells us the audit opinion the 
companies would have received if they had chosen non-Big 4 auditors rather than Big 
4 auditors.  
I expect that Big 4 auditees are firms that perform very well and desire 
high-quality audit reports. If they get clean audit opinions from Big 4 auditors, it is 
reasonable to expect that they would also get clean opinions from non-Big 4 auditors. 
In addition, firms that receive modified opinions from Big 4 auditors would probably 
get clean opinions from non-Big 4 auditors, because non-Big 4 auditors may be less 
competent and less independent. Therefore, the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio 
for the Big 4 group should be negative, as Big 4 auditees would have received a greater 
number of clean audit opinions if they had chosen non-Big 4 auditors. I expect the 
direction of adjustment of the inverse Mills ratio is negative in the second step of the 
Heckman logit regression for audit prediction by Big 4 auditors. 
3.2.2. Generating a Proxy for Audit Collusion 
Previous studies of audit collusion, such as those of Tirole (1986), Kofman and 
Lawarree (1996), and Peyrache and Quesada (2005), usually focus on the analytical 
results from the agency problem and incentive theory perspectives. Several studies 
(Ellingsen and Frederic, 1986; Chow and Rice, 1982; Smith, 1986; Krishnan, 1994; 
Krishnan and Stephens, 1995; Lennox, 2000) employ an empirical regression model to 
find evidence of the existence of collusive firms and auditors. However, these studies 
usually focus on opinion shopping, and use auditor switching and subsequent opinions 
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as proxies for collusion. Empirical studies have found little evidence of success in 
opinion shopping because auditors tend to treat switchers more conservatively than 
non-switchers in their opinion decisions (Krishnan, 1994). Although some studies find 
empirical evidence of opinion shopping (Lennox, 2000), these studies focus on 
collusive behavior in the case of auditor switching, and overlook the possibility of 
audit collusion without switching. In this paper, I introduce a proxy for audit collusion 
in terms of the difference between the predicted opinion and actual opinion of non-Big 
4 auditors in China, and expect this variable can capture the existence of audit 
collusion in both auditor switching and non-switching circumstances.  
I assume that Big 4 auditors are more professional and carry out their verification 
duties independently for two reasons. First, DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as 
the joint probability of detecting and reporting material financial statement errors, and 
points out that larger audit firms have incentives to supply a higher level of audit 
quality. She argues that large auditors have more clients, and their good reputation 
enables these auditors to remain active in the competitive audit market and 
consistently make profit from their clients. It is not a real bargain if the auditor 
sacrifices independence and reports favorably for specific clients, as such an auditor 
will lose more clients because of its ruined reputation. DeAngelo suggests that auditor 
size can be used as a proxy for audit quality. Second, Big 4 firms appear to be brand 
name producers in the audit market (Francis and Wilson, 1988). Renown is the most 
important goal of these international audit firms rather than the limited rents they 
could generate from occasional audit collusion. Furthermore, Fan and Wong (2005) 
find that Big 5 auditors do have a corporate governance role in emerging markets, and 
Big 5 auditors generally play a more important governance functions in countries 
where legal institutions are weak than in countries where legal institutions are strong 
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(Choi and Wong, 2007).  Consistent with the literature, I expect that Big 4 auditors 
hold high reputations and are high-quality audit suppliers in China’s capital market. 
The audit quality of China’s local auditors, however, is mixed. On the one hand, 
some researchers (DeFond, Wong, and Li, 1999) ague that China’s top 10 auditors (in 
terms of audit fee revenues) provide high-quality audits. Government authorities and 
bureaucrats make great efforts to regulate the top 10 auditors in order to create a 
healthy capital market and build domestic auditors’ brand names for competition with 
international Big 4 auditors. On the other hand, Chan, Lin, and Mo (2006) argue that 
China’s local auditors usually have greater economic dependence on local clients and 
are subject to more political influence from local governments than non-local auditors. 
Therefore, local auditors are inclined to report favorably on local government-owned 
enterprises to mitigate probable economic losses. To generate a proxy for audit 
collusion, I put the firm characteristics of non-Big 4 auditees into the logit audit 
opinion prediction model estimated using Big 4 auditees’ data, and estimate a series of 
audit opinions for non-Big 4 auditees. This step tells us what the audit opinion of these 
non-Big 4 auditees would have been if they had been audited by a typical independent 
auditor.  
Specifically, if the predicted audit opinion is the same as the actual opinion that 
the listed firm received for that fiscal year, it is assumed that no audit collusion exists 
and the proxy for audit collusion equals zero. If the predicted audit opinion is clean and 
the actual audit opinion is modified, it is still assumed that no audit collusion exists 
because the auditors already reported independently. However, if the predicted opinion 
is modified and actual audit opinion is clean, the audit collusion proxy is set to equal 
one to denote the existence of audit collusion between the auditor and auditee.  
3.2.3. Stage Two － Audit Collusion Determinant Testing Model 
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In the second stage of the regression, I try to test my hypotheses and identify the 
determinants of audit collusion. I include four kinds of variables in the regression, 
including SOE indicators and their interaction terms, corporate governance 
characteristics, financial information, and institutional factors. The inverse Mills ratios 
are included to control for the self-selection problem between auditees and auditors. I 
also control for year effects to explain changes in the macroeconomic environment. 
(i) SOE Indicators 
The government is the ultimate owner of SOEs, and these firms can bring the 
government benefits other than profits. The number of listed SOEs in a specific region 
is regarded as not only a political achievement by the local government’s leaders, but 
also a symbol of economic prosperity that determines the officers’ opportunities for 
promotion to higher positions. In addition, SOEs bear many burdens of the local 
government, by over-hiring employees to reduce the unemployment rate in that region, 
tunneling profits to other SOEs in the same area to prevent these firms from going 
bankrupt, or financing infrastructure construction in the region. The local government 
has strong incentive to use every means to keep SOEs listed in order to fulfill all of 
these objectives. However, auditors who previously were affiliated with local 
governments, and are still under political pressure by government and financial 
bureaus, have a heavy economic dependence on their SOE clients, which constitute a 
great proportion of their total clientele. I introduce SOE as an indicator to capture the 
collusive behavior between auditors and their SOE clients, and expect the coefficient 
to be positive if SOEs take part in audit collusion. Here, SOE is defined as a firm the 
ultimate owner of which is the government. I use one minus dummy variable SOE to 
represent the firms that have non-government shareholders as their ultimate 
shareholders. Because these firms cannot exert political influence over auditors, I 
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expect that these non-SOEs do not take part in audit collusion and the predicted sign is 
negative.  
I also employ some interaction terms to test my hypotheses. I calculate a proxy, 
Pfmc, for firm financial status from all financial variables to verify the relation 
between financial condition and audit collusion. Pfmc is a rank transformation 
calculated from the rankings of all financial variables. I rank each financial variable 
from good to bad, sum up all the financial variable rankings, and get a final number for 
each firm observation in the sample. Then, I rank these numbers upward, assign the 
first half of these firms a value of 0 for their pfmc variable, which means the firm is in 
good financial condition, and assign the other half of the firms a value of 1 for their 
pfmc variable. Similarly, the interactions between a non-SOE and its financial status 
indicators are introduced. Consistent with my hypotheses, I expect that only SOEs in 
poor financial condition are likely to be involved in audit collusion, and if so, the 
coefficient for the interaction of SOE and loss should be positive. In contrast, other 
firms, including SOEs in good financial condition, and non-SOEs in either good or 
poor financial condition, will not take part in collusive behavior, and all coefficients 
for these three interactions are expected to be significantly negative.  
I also include the interactions between the SOE indicator and percentage that the 
largest shareholder holds in listed firms to test the differential effects that share 
concentration will have on audit collusion in firms of different types of ownership. The 
largest shareholders in SOEs do not have the same interests as non-state shareholders; 
hence, they are likely to expropriate other shareholders. I hypothesize that share 
concentration in SOEs will lead to audit collusion, and that concentrated non-state 
ownership will deter audit collusion. Therefore, the expected sign for the interaction of 
SOE and the share percentage of the largest shareholder should be positive, and the 
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coefficient of the interaction of non-SOE and largest shareholder ownership 
percentage is expected to be negative.  
(ii) Corporate Governance and Financial Characteristics 
In contrast to prior studies, I introduce a new variable, Age, which equals the 
average age of top-level managers of a listed firm. I use this variable to proxy the 
working experience of managers, and expect that the more experienced senior 
managers are, the less likely they will take part in audit collusion. The underlying 
reason is twofold. First, experienced managers are more sophisticated in controlling 
and organizing listed firms, and good management guarantees that firms operate in a 
more effective and efficient way. A well-managed firm is more likely to be a profit 
entity and hence has less motivation to take part in audit collusion. Second, 
experienced managers have a better understanding of the detrimental consequences 
that audit collusion will bring to their firms and the legal obligations they will incur if 
such collusive behavior is exposed to the public. Sophisticated managers will be more 
cautious when considering audit collusion as a way to mask their poor performance. 
Hence, experienced managers are less likely to be involved in audit collusion 
compared with inexperienced managers. The prior literature indicates that firms 
usually receive a favorable audit opinion after switching auditors. Therefore, the 
coefficient on the variable Switch is expected to be positive. Independent Ratio 
denotes the ratio of independent board of directors to the total number of directors, and 
I expect that a more independent board of directors will lead to less audit collusion. 
The relation between the independent ratio and audit collusion should be negative. A 
dummy variable Delisting is included to capture the profitability regulations the firms 
are required to meet. CSRC mandates that any listed firm with losses for three 
successive years can be delisted at discretion of regulators. I define variable Delisting 
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equals to one if this listed firm already has two consecutive losses in previous years, 
and intend to use this dummy variable to reflect the firm’s exposure to delisting 
punishment. The relation between delisting threat and the participant of auditing 
collusion is mixed. On one hand, Haw et al. (2005) find that listed firms in China 
manipulate their earnings in order to meet security regulations. From this aspect, firms 
that engage in earnings management might collude with their auditors to mask their 
misbehavior, and a positive relation between delisting dummy and audit collusion is 
suggested. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2001) point out that profitability 
requirements exacerbate managers’ propensity to engage in earnings management, 
however, this tendency of manipulation positively associated with receiving modified 
audit opinions. Therefore, auditors may treat their clients that could be delisted in the 
next fiscal year more conservatively, and hence, are less likely to collude with such 
clients. 
Consistent with my hypotheses, I expect that firms with superior financial 
performance will be disinclined to take part in audit collusion. Specifically, firms with 
larger assets and a higher current ratio and ROE, and lower leverage, receivables, and 
inventory are less likely to be involved in audit collusion. Because the performance of 
firms is highly consistent, I also expect that firms that received a modified audit 
opinion in the previous year will have demonstrated poor performance in the current 
year, and have a strong incentive to collude with their auditors. Similarly, firm capital 
market performance should have a positive relationship with audit collusion. DeFond 
et al. (1999) introduced a time-listed variable and argue that older clients are more 
susceptible to financial distress. Therefore, keeping other conditions constant, 
companies after being listed for some years are more likely to engage in earnings 
management to meet the regulatory profitability requirements and thus receive a 
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qualified opinion than are newly listed firms (Chen et al., 2000). I expect audit 
collusion has a positive relationship with time listed.  
(iii) Institutional Factors and Inverse Mills Ratios 
The prior literature indicates that institutional factors affect auditor decisions. The 
three indices borrowed from Fan and Wang are designed to capture the influence of 
institutional factors on audit collusion. I use rank transformation of these three factors 
to form one institutional variable because these three indices are highly correlated and 
the rankings are stable, and reveal the relative institutional status of each 
administrative region. Market rank denotes the development of a capital market. The 
more developed a capital market is, the more sensitively its investors react to financial 
information, hence it is more difficult for listed firms to collude with their auditors 
because of investor monitoring. A government index is used to measure the degree of 
government involvement. Strong government interference means more political 
pressure on auditors, and more audit collusion. In addition, a sound legal system and 
very strong enforcement will lead to higher litigation risk for both parties that are 
involved in audit collusion, so it is reasonable to assume that audit collusion occurs 
less frequently in a good legal environment than in a bad legal environment. Therefore, 
I expect a poor institutional environment leads to audit collusion. 
The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio indicates what the situation would be like 
if the other group were selected. Big 4 auditors are expected to be less involved in 
audit collusion than their counterparts. The inverse Mills ratio denotes what the 
situation would be if I tested audit collusion using Big 4 auditees. As I elaborated 
above, it is easy to conceive that Big 4 auditees are less likely to take part in audit 
collusion, so all the coefficients of the inverse Mills ratios are expected to be negative.  
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4. Results 
4.1. Audit Opinion Prediction Model 
Table 4 presents the results for the first-step probit regression of self-selecting Big 
4 auditors. The table shows that firms with an internal audit committee have a strong 
preference to select Big 4 auditors. Firms that are large in terms of assets and have a 
higher current ratio tend to choose Big 4 auditors, whereas firms that have greater 
long-term debt and more inventory try to avoid high-quality auditors for their financial 
reports. B share has a positive relation with self-selected Big 4 auditors as expected. 
Stock price fluctuation positively contributes to self-selected high-quality auditors. 
One possible explanation is that listed firms with high stock price variations might be 
going through a period of expansion that could lead to greater future trade volume. 
These growing firms tend to self-select large auditors to verify their financial 
statements in order to send a positive signal to the capital market. Institutional factors 
may affect the behavior patterns of financial report issuers; therefore, listed firms in a 
poor institutional environment are inclined to avoid high-quality auditors for ease of 
audit collusion, and the sign for institutional index ranking transformation is 
significantly negative, as I expected. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 represents the statistical output of the second-step opinion prediction logit 
model with and without the inverse Mills ratios for Big 4 auditors. When running the 
logit regression without the inverse Mills ratios, some of the coefficients (e.g., current 
ratio and leverage) have signs opposite to my expectations, whereas others (e.g., 
current year loss dummy, prior year opinion type, and institutional environment) show 
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significant relationships with audit opinions. However, when I add the inverse Mills 
ratio to the logit regression model, all of the coefficients are adjusted, with the 
direction of some coefficients changed (e.g., current ratio and leverage). After 
controlling for self-selection bias, the significance of some variables is also greatly 
enhanced. Correlation matrix of independent variables including inverse Mils ratio 
indicates that there is no multicollinearity problem. For instance, firms with a larger 
amount of assets, less inventory, and better performance in the stock market are less 
likely to receive modified audit opinions. In addition, the coefficient for the 
institutional environment variable changes from 0.0965 at the 10% level of 
significance to 0.3645 at the 1% level of significance, and the pseudo R-squared for 
the overall model increases by nearly 5% and shows a relatively higher goodness of fit. 
The significantly negative coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio captures the audit 
opinion companies would have received if they had chosen non-Big 4 auditors. 
Because Big 4 auditors are more independent and their clients are in better financial 
condition, their clients would have received more clean opinions if they had chosen 
firms in the alternative group of auditors.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The adjusted opinion prediction model suggests that Big 4 auditors consider client 
size, profitability, and potential litigation risk as key factors when issuing audit 
opinions. That is, Big 4 auditors tend to issue modified audit opinions if their clients 
received a modified opinion in the previous year. It is interesting to note that the 
coefficient of ROE is not significant at all, which suggests that Big 4 auditors do not 
value firm book earning highly. Firms that issue B shares are less likely to receive 
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qualified opinions, and firms with good performance in the stock market and with a 
market performance superior to that of other firms in the same industry tend to receive 
clean audit opinions. Finally, firms located in regions with a weak institutional 
environment tend to receive modified audit opinions.  
4.2. Audit Collusion Proxy Generation 
In the process of audit collusion proxy generation, I apply the audit opinion 
prediction model by Big 4 auditors to non-Big 4 auditees, and then get the predicted 
audit opinions for each client of non-Big 4 auditors. I first apply the audit opinion 
prediction model to Big 4 auditees themselves to check the self-prediction accuracy of 
my model. Panel A of Table 6 indicates that the audit opinion prediction model for Big 
4 auditees has about 98.26% self-prediction accuracy. According to my definition of 
the audit collusion proxy, only 1 of the 394 firms audited by Big 4 auditors has a sign 
for audit collusion, which accounts for approximately 0.25% of the total number of 
firms that are audited by Big 4 auditors. It is worthwhile to mention that among the Big 
4 auditees, the actual opinions of seven firms are modified whereas their predicted 
opinions are clean. The predictive ability of my model might cause some 
misclassification; however, another plausible explanation exists. I interpret these 
seven audit cases as “conservative” cases, that is, the auditors involved in these cases 
are more conservative on average than other Big 4 auditors when issuing audit 
opinions.   
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Panel B of Table 6 shows that 190 firms that are audited by non-Big 4 auditors 
have modified predicted audit opinions, but have clean opinions as their actual audit 
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opinions. These firms account for 3.90% of the total number of non-Big 4 auditees in 
my sample. The audit collusion proxy for these 190 firms is equal to 1, and the rest of 
the firms that audited by non-Big 4 auditors show no evidence of audit collusion. 
Similarly, 252 cases (5.17%) are conservative cases. Three possible explanations are 
given. First, as I previously mentioned, some non-Big 4 auditors in China are as large 
as Big 4 auditors in terms of market share, and these auditors have the same incentives 
as Big 4 auditors to be independent; thus, they treat clients conservatively. Second, the 
CSRC mandates that any listed firm with two successive years of losses or with an 
asset value per share less than the face value will be specially treated (ST) on the stock 
exchange, and a listed firm with losses for three successive years is classified as a 
“particular transfer (PT)” firm, which can be delisted at the discretion of regulators. 
ST/PT firms account for 6.32% of firms in the collusion group, and for 4.33% of firms 
in the group that has a predicted opinion the same as the actual audit opinion (control 
group). However, ST/PT firms account for 21.42% of firms in the conservative group. 
These firms are subject to more regulations and litigation risk; therefore, it is rational 
for auditors to be more conservative when issuing audit opinions to ST/PT firms. Third, 
when the influence of the institutional environment is considered, the reason for 
auditor conservatism is more obvious. The mean of the institutional factor ranking for 
the collusive group is 15.684, for the control group 11.884, and for the conservative 
group 10.7302, and the mean differences between these three groups are significant at 
the 1% level. It can be seen from the results that audit collusion occurs in regions with 
a relatively poor institutional environment, and that conservative treatment of clients 
by auditors usually occurs in regions with a good institutional environment. The 
results also support my hypothesis that a good institutional environment can deter 
audit collusion. 
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Moreover, only 35 out of 190 collusive audit cases switched their auditors during 
the sample period. This finding reinforces my earlier point that auditor switching is not 
an adequate indicator of audit collusion, and the prior literature about opinion 
shopping cannot fully capture the collusive behavior between auditors and their 
clients.  
I find empirical evidence of the existence of audit collusion in China’s capital 
market even without using auditor switching as an indicator4. Some factors may 
influence the accuracy of the audit collusion proxy. First, employing the difference 
between the actual audit opinion and predicted audit opinion to generate an audit 
collusion proxy depends on the assumption that the accounting numbers that appear on 
the financial reports reflect the true performance of listed companies. However, fake 
transactions that are designed to boost earnings but are not detected by auditors cannot 
be captured in my proxy generation process. Second, because Big 4 auditors do not 
have a relatively high market share in China’s audit market, the sample size of Big 4 
auditees is not very large. However, my model appears very reliable, because it 
achieves high accuracy in self-prediction for Big 4 auditees. 
4.3. Determinants of Audit Collusion 
The logit regression results for audit collusion determinants are reported in Table 
7 and Table 8. Consistent with my hypotheses, the coefficient for the SOE indicator is 
0.5615, significant at the 5% level, which denotes a high relation between audit 
collusion and SOE ownership. The interaction between the SOE indicator and its 
financial performance proxy, pfmc, which is a rank transformation of all financial 
variables of listed firms, is also positively related with audit collusion. This result 
                                                        
4 The Audit Quality Announcement No. 4 issued by National Audit Office of Peoples’ Republic of China on 
September, 26th, 2005 disclosed nine audit firms that had issued questionable audit reports towards their clients. My 
model successfully captures 6 of them. They are Vocation International (8 collusive cases), China Rightson 
Certificated Public Accountants (2 collusive cases), Sichuan Junhe Certificated Public Accountants (5 collusive 
cases), Shinewing Certificated Public Accountants (1 collusive cases), Hunan Carea Certificated Public 
Accountants (13 collusive cases), and Zhonghongxin Jianyuan Certificated Public Accountants (5 collusive cases). 
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shows that enterprises with the government as the ultimate shareholder and 
demonstrating poor financial performance are more inclined to collude with their 
auditors. However, the interactions that represent SOEs with superior financial 
performance, and non-SOEs with either good or poor financial performance, have 
negative relations with audit collusion 5 . These empirical results fully support 
hypothesis one, which posits that state-owned firms take part in audit collusion, 
especially when they have poor financial performance. SOEs in good financial 
condition do not need to collude with their auditors, whereas non-SOEs do not take 
part in audit collusion because they do not have to power to exert political pressure on 
their auditors. The coefficient for the product of SOEs and share percentage of the 
largest shareholder is significantly positive at the 5% level, and the coefficient for the 
interaction of non-SOEs and share percentage of the largest shareholder is 
significantly negative at the 5% level. These results suggest that share concentration in 
the hands of the government induces audit collusion, whereas share concentration in 
the hands of private individual investors aligns the interests of the largest shareholders 
and those of other shareholders, hence deterring audit collusion. Therefore, hypothesis 
two is supported. 
 
[Insert Table 7 and Table 8 here] 
 
Age, which denotes the average age of all senior managers, shows a negative 
relation with audit collusion. This finding suggests that the more experienced the top 
managers, the less likely they are to guide the firm to take part in audit collusion. 
                                                        
5 For Table 7, the interactions of SOE*Pfmc and SOE*(1-Pfmc) denote SOEs with inferior financial performance, 
and SOEs with superior financial performance, respectively. While, for Table 8, (1-SOE)*Pfmc and 
(1-SOE)*(1-Pfmc) denote non-SOEs with inferior financial performance, and non-SOEs with superior financial 
performance, respectively. 
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Auditor switching has a positive relation with audit collusion. However, neither of 
these two variables shows significant effects on audit collusion, which supports my 
assertions that audit collusion is not necessarily linked to auditor switching and that 
methods that use only auditor switching as an indicator for audit collusion are flawed. 
The regression results show that the greater the proportion of non-executive directors 
to the total number of directors on the board of directors, the less likely is the listed 
firm to take part in audit collusion. Again, although all the coefficients show a clear 
negative connection between the independent ratio and audit collusion, the 
relationship is not significant. Firms with a potential delisting risk show an 
insignificantly negative relation with audit collusion. There are two possible 
explanations: First, firms that have two consecutive losses in the previous two years, 
and already drew attention by CSRC. These firms are under a more strict supervision 
from regulators, and hence have fewer opportunities to collude with their auditors. 
Second, auditors treat firms that probably will be delisted in current fiscal year more 
conservatively in order to avoid litigation risks. Firms with superior overall 
performance, say a larger amount of assets, a higher current ratio, lower leverage, and 
with positive revenue, are not inclined to take part in audit collusion. It is worthwhile 
to point out that ROE has a very significantly positive relationship with audit collusion. 
I argue this result is based on the low quality of book earnings in China’s capital 
market. In China, listed firms have to meet certain profit requirements in order to 
continue to be listed or make seasonal offerings, and these regulations create a strong 
incentive for listed firms to manipulate earnings. This finding also partially explains 
why Big 4 auditors do not value book earnings highly when they issue audit opinions. 
Moreover, higher litigation risk leads to audit collusion, as both receivables and 
inventory have significantly positive relations with audit collusion. The literature 
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indicates a high consistency between audit opinion in the current period and prior 
periods, so firms that have received modified audit opinions in the past tend to collude 
with their auditors in the current period to avoid receiving another modified audit 
opinion. Evidence shows a strong positive connection between the receipt of a 
modified opinion in the previous year and audit collusion in the current period. 
Consistent with DeFond et al. (1999), I find that a long listing time results in audit 
collusion, as older clients are more likely to run out of IPO funds and face financial 
distress. Firms that issue B shares have a higher demand for quality auditors to verify 
their financial reports in order to signal the market and assure their foreign owners of 
their financial condition; therefore, these firms are less likely to take part in audit 
collusion. Firms with better performance in the stock market also do not tend to be 
involved in collusion. The coefficient of institutional environment, which is a rank 
transformation of the three institutional sub-indexes, is significantly positively 
correlated with audit collusion. This empirical result suggests that audit collusion is 
more likely to happen in regions with a poor institutional environment than in regions 
with a good institutional environment. Moreover, based on their institutional overall 
rankings, I classify the first half of regions as the good institutional environment group 
and the second half as the poor institutional environment group, and then I rerun the 
regression for each group and compare the coefficients of SOE and its interaction 
items between the two groups. No significant differences of the coefficients between 
the good institutional environment group and poor institutional environment group are 
found. Hence, there is a lack of evidence that SOEs are less likely to take part in audit 
collusion in regions with a good institutional environment than in those with a poor 
institutional environment. Hence, hypothesis three is only partially supported. 
4.4. Limitations and Sensitivity Tests 
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I conduct some robustness checks of my main results. First, following Chan, Lin, 
and Mo (2005), I employ a more precise definition of SOEs. I redefine an SOE as a 
listed firm with the government as the ultimate owner, and the largest state-owned 
share has to be at least 20%. The results remain the same and indicate that SOEs are 
more likely to take part in audit collusion. 
Second, the dummy variable Loss is used as an alternative indicator to denote a 
firm’s financial situation. I use the interaction of SOE and loss to represent SOEs of 
inferior financial status. One minus loss represents SOEs with superior financial status. 
I get the same results. Third, instead of using rankings for institutional environment, I 
use the sum of the government involvement index, capital market development index, 
and legal enforcement index as the institutional characteristic for a specific 
administrative region. I obtain the same results, which indicates that audit collusion is 
more likely to occur in regions with a poor institutional environment.  
This study has a number of limitations. First, I divide audit opinion into two 
categories, clean and modified, and I capture audit collusion only from modified types 
of opinion to clean opinion, but do not consider the severity of the opinions. For 
example, I do not distinguish between a qualified audit opinion and a qualified audit 
opinion with explanatory paragraphs, or between an adverse opinion and a disclaimer 
of opinion. Second, when using the audit opinion prediction model, I assume that all 
financial statement data are reliable and reflect the firms’ true performance. However, 
some audit scandals indicate that firms will manipulate their financial figures to cover 
their poor performance. To the extent that firms’ financial statements are not reliable, 
my estimation model will be subject to error. Third, unlike the case in some Western 
countries, in which Big 4 auditors have a very large market share, Big 4 auditors 
occupy a relatively small share of the audit market in China. My results would be more 
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convincing if the sample size of Big 4 auditees were larger. 
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5. Conclusion 
This study examines the existence and determinants of audit collusion in a 
transitional economy. I develop the research hypotheses based on the relation between 
firm ownership, institutional environment, and audit collusion. I expect that audit 
collusion exists with or without auditor switching. SOEs are more likely to take part in 
audit collusion, especially when they are in poor financial condition. However, SOEs 
with good financial performance, and non-SOEs with either good or poor financial 
performance are not inclined to take part in audit collusion. I also expect that share 
concentration will have varying influence on audit collusion. That is, state-owned 
share concentration will lead to audit collusion, whereas non-state-owned share 
concentration will deter audit collusion because it mitigates the free-rider problem of 
monitoring small shareholders and aligns the interests of the largest shareholder with 
those of other shareholders. Furthermore, I expect audit collusion to occur more often 
in regions with a poor institutional environment. 
Using data from China’s capital market and employing a two-stage logit 
regression model with a two-step binary probit model to correct for self-selection bias, 
I find empirical evidence for audit collusion, and all of my hypotheses are supported. 
My results contribute to the audit collusion literature by providing for the first time 
empirical evidence of the relationships among firm ownership, institutional 
environment, and audit collusion. The implications of my findings for both researchers 
and practitioners are threefold. 
First, my measure of audit collusion is unique. I define audit collusion as the 
discrepancy between the actual opinions that clients received from their auditors and 
the opinions they would have received under similar circumstances from a “typical” 
auditor. This method adds to the limited literature on audit collusion, and opens a new 
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horizon for future empirical research on collusion. 
Second, I introduce a two-step binary probit self-selection model into my audit 
opinion prediction model. I also include institutional variables to capture the uneven 
economic and legal development across China. This method contributes to the 
development of audit opinion prediction and has very good classification ability, 
especially in a transitional economy in which a great discrepancy exists in the audit 
quality between Big 4 auditors and local auditors, and in which cross-sectional uneven 
development of institutional factors exists. 
Finally, my results have implications for policy makers in transitional economies 
that are characterized by firms with highly concentrated government ownership and a 
relatively poor institutional infrastructure. Audit collusion is detrimental for capital 
market development, especially in emerging markets. To deter audit collusion, 
governments should improve the overall institutional environment through measures 
such as reduction of government ownership of firms, withdrawal of government 
involvement in both the stock and audit markets, and development of the legal 
environment.  
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Appendix 1. Three Indices for Each Administrative Region  
 
Region Credit Market Index 
Government 
Involvement 
Index 
Legal 
Environment 
Index 
 Institutional 
Environment 
Overall Ranking
ANHUI 5.24 7.43 5.32 9 
BEIJING 3.85 6.40 7.97 8 
CHONGQIONG 6.33 7.61 3.83 11 
FUJIAN 3.74 7.12 6.32 13 
GANSU 4.70 5.94 3.98 20 
GUANGDONG 6.37 7.99 7.29 4 
GUANGXI 3.46 7.89 4.92 16 
GUIZHOU 4.89 5.43 4.36 19 
HAINAN 5.25 6.02 6.33 12 
HEBEI 7.20 7.13 5.15 6 
HEILONGJIANG 1.89 3.60 5.34 28 
HENAN 5.80 5.54 4.93 15 
HUBEI 4.21 5.11 5.05 22 
HUNAN 5.90 5.73 2.62 23 
JIANGSU 7.67 8.12 6.29 3 
JIANGXI 4.69 6.15 4.78 17 
JILIN 5.37 5.70 5.81 14 
LIAONING 6.16 6.14 5.53 10 
NEIMENGGU 3.42 3.27 4.93 26 
NINGXIA 4.36 3.79 5.16 24 
QINGHAI 0.35 3.04 4.69 30 
SHAN’XI 5.88 5.30 3.21 21 
SHANDONG 7.74 7.38 5.63 5 
SHANGHAI 7.94 7.49 6.98 1 
SHANXI 1.08 4.54 5.53 27 
SICHUAN 0.70 7.43 4.69 25 
TIANJIN 5.34 6.05 6.96 7 
XINJIANG 0.90 3.16 4.10 29 
YUNNAN 4.75 6.56 3.87 18 
ZHEJIANG 7.68 8.37 6.24 2 
Indices for Tibet, where there is no company in the sample, are not provided. 
 
Note: These three indices are based on the 2002 data from Fan and Wang (2003). The Credit 
Market Index, Government Decentralization Index, and Legal Environment Index measure the 
development of the local credit market, the degree of government involvement in the local 
economy, and the development of the local legal environment for each province or province-level 
region, respectively. Rank transformations according to these three indices are adopted in all 
regressions in this paper.
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Table 1. Sample Description 
 
Panel A: Number of Firms by Year, Firm Ownership, and Auditor Size 
 
SOE Non-SOE Big 4 Non-Big 4  
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Total
2001 627 84.6 114 15.4 40 5.4 701 94.6 741 
2002 643 81.1 150 18.9 74 9.3 719 90.7 793 
2003 674 77.1 200 22.9 75 8.6 799 91.4 874 
2004 681 74.0 239 26.0 69 7.5 851 92.5 920 
2005 717 73.2 263 26.8 69 7.0 911 93.0 980 
2006 649 67.6 311 32.4 67 7.0 893 93.0 960 
Total 3991 75.8 1277 24.2 394 7.5 4874 92.5 5268 
 
Panel B: Client Firm Ownership by Auditor Size and Year 
 
Big 4 Auditors Non-Big 4 Auditors  
SOE % Non-SOE % Total SOE % Non-SOE % Total 
2001 33 82.5 7 17.5 40 594 84.7 107 15.3 701 
2002 64 86.5 10 13.5 74 579 80.5 140 19.5 719 
2003 65 86.7 10 13.3 75 609 76.2 190 23.8 799 
2004 58 84.1 11 15.9 69 623 73.2 228 26.8 851 
2005 57 82.6 12 17.4 69 660 72.4 251 27.6 911 
2006 54 80.6 13 19.4 67 595 66.6 298 33.4 893 
Total 331 84.0 63 16.0 394 3660 75.1 1214 24.9 4874 
 
Panel C: Audit Opinion by Auditor Size and Year 
 
Big 4 Auditors Non-Big 4 Auditors  
Modified % Clean % Total Modified % Clean % Total
2001 2 5.0 38 95.0 40 79 11.3 622 88.7 701 
2002 7 9.5 67 90.5 74 80 11.1 639 88.9 719 
2003 1 1.3 74 98.7 75 55 6.9 744 93.1 799 
2004 6 8.7 63 91.3 69 81 9.5 770 90.5 851 
2005 3 4.3 66 95.7 69 100 11.0 811 89.0 911 
2006 5 7.5 62 92.5 67 76 8.5 817 91.5 893 
Total 24 6.1 370 93.9 394 471 9.7 4403 90.3 4874
 
Notes: SOE denotes a listed firm the ultimate owner of which is the government.  
Big 4 denotes firms that are audited by Big 4 auditing firms in that fiscal year; Non-Big 4 denotes 
firms that are audited by accounting firms that are not Big 4 auditing firms. 
Modified opinions include an unqualified opinion with explanation, a qualified opinion, a 
disclaimer of opinion, and an adverse opinion. 
A clean opinion refers to a standard unqualified opinion. 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. 
Financial Variables: 
Assets 21.306 0.956 17.412 21.227 27.111 
Current_Ratio 1.356 0.850 0.020 1.173 6.255 
Leverage 0.233 0.368 0.000 0.103 3.348 
ROE -0.005 0.360 -4.986 0.056 3.338 
Loss 0.131 0.337 0 0 1 
Receivables 0.086 0.069 0.000 0.071 0.319 
Inventory 0.142 0.108 0.000 0.121 0.548 
Capital Market Variables: 
B_Share 0.067 0.249 0 0 1 
Beta 1.045 0.250 0.165 1.071 1.865 
Fluctuations 2.413 0.561 0.515 2.352 4.869 
Firm_Avg＊ -0.017 0.111 -0.399 -0.027 0.389 
Other Variables: 
Big_4 0.075 0.263 0 0 1 
Opinion 0.094 0.292 0 0 1 
Prior_Opinion 0.092 0.289 0 0 1 
SOE 0.758 0.429 0 1 1 
Age 45.727 3.390 35 46 58 
Time 6.744 3.191 1.005 6.541 16.033 
Switch 0.113 0.316 0 0 1 
In_Audit 0.375 0.484 0 0 1 
Indp_Ratio 0.432 0.229 0 0.5 3 
Delisting 0.031 0.172 0 0 1 
No_1_Share 41.676 16.833 3.23 40.14 85 
Pfmc 0.500 0.500 0 0.500 1 
Institution 11.573 8.979 1 9 30 
 
＊Industry classification is based on the CSRC’s (China Securities Regulatory Commission’s) 
industry classification as follows: 
 
  Mining industry; 
  Communication and literature industry; 
  Utilities industry; 
  Real estate industry; 
  Construction industry; 
  Transportation industry; 
  Agriculture, forestry, and fishing industry; 
  Wholesale and retail industry; 
  Social services industry; 
  Information technology industry; and 
  Manufacturing industry. 
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Panel B: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition   
Financial Variables: 
Assets Natural log of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Current_Ratio The ratio of current assets to current liabilities at the end of the fiscal year. 
Leverage The ratio of long-term debt to shareholders’ equity at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
ROE The ratio of net income to shareholders’ equity at the end of the fiscal year. 
Loss Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s net income in the current year is 
negative, and 0 otherwise. 
Receivables  The ratio of receivables to total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Inventory The ratio of inventory to total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Capital Market Variables: 
B_Share Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm issued B shares, and 0 otherwise. 
Beta Beta coefficient of the CAPM model. 
Fluctuations The standard deviation of daily stock prices during the fiscal year. 
Firm_Avg＊ Common stock returns (including dividends) minus an equally weighted 
industry return. 
Other Variables: 
Big_4 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, and 0 
otherwise. 
Opinion Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm received a modified opinion for the 
current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
Prior_Opinion Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm received a modified opinion for the 
previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
SOE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled by the 
government, and 0 otherwise. 
Age Average age of all top level managers. 
Time Total listing time that a firm is listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 
Switch Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm changes its auditor in the current fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
In_Audit Variable equal to 1 if the company has an internal audit committee, and 0 
otherwise. 
Indp_Ratio Ratio of independent board directors to the total number of board directors. 
Delisting Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a two year consecutive losses in the 
previous two fiscal years, and 0 otherwise. 
No_1_Share The percentage of shares owned by the firm’s largest shareholder. 
Pfmc The overall financial performance of the listed firm, equal to 1 if the listed 
firm is in poor financial condition, and 0 otherwise. 
Institution Overall rankings of the local credit market, government interference, and 
legal enforcement for each administrative region. 
Imills Inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman two-step logit regression. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on Client Characteristics by Auditor Size 
 
Firm Characteristics Big 4 Non Big 4 P-Value 
Financial Variables: 
Mean 22.360 21.221 0.0000*** 
Median 22.135 21.173 0.0000*** Assets 
Std. Dev. 1.330 0.865 - 
Mean 1.4302 1.3499 0.0712* 
Median 1.1904 1.1722 0.1234 Current_Ratio 
Std. Dev. 0.9448 0.8412 - 
Mean 0.2544 0.2311 0.2276 
Median 0.1044 0.1025 0.0693* Leverage 
Std. Dev. 0.3837 0.3671 - 
Mean 0.0517 -0.0097 0.0011*** 
Median 0.0774 0.0528 0.0000*** ROE 
Std. Dev. 0.3038 0.3642 - 
Mean 0.0711 0.1356 0.0003*** 
Median 0 0 0.0328** Loss 
Std. Dev. 0.2573 0.3424 - 
Mean 0.0711 0.0874 0.0000*** 
Median 0.0483 0.0731 0.0000*** Receivables 
Std. Dev. 0.0680 0.0686 - 
Mean 0.1304 0.1432 0.0243** 
Median 0.1154 0.1209 0.0093*** Inventory 
Std. Dev. 0.1096 0.1080 - 
Capital Market Variables: 
Mean 0.2538 0.0515 0.0000*** 
Median 0 0 0.0000*** B_Share 
Std. Dev. 0.4357 0.2210 - 
Mean 1.0491 1.0442 0.7114 
Median 1.0707 1.0712 0.8344 Beta 
Std. Dev. 0.2230 0.2525 - 
Mean 2.3435 2.4187 0.0105** 
Median 2.2933 2.3572 0.0107** Fluctuations 
Std. Dev. 0.5223 0.5638 - 
Mean 0.0105 -0.0193 0.0000*** 
Median -0.0099 -0.0289 0.0000*** Firm_Avg 
Std. Dev. 0.1201 0.1104 - 
Other Variables: 
Mean 0.0609 0.0966 0.0194** 
Median 0 0 0.2375 Opinion 
Std. Dev. 0.2395 0.2955 - 
Mean 0.0406 0.0958 0.0003*** 
Median 0 0 0.0679* Prior_Opinion 
Std. Dev. 0.1976 0.2944 - 
Mean 0.8401 0.7509 0.0001*** 
Median 1 1 0.0032*** SOE 
Std. Dev. 0.3670 0.4325 - 
Mean 47.1675 45.6110 0.0000*** 
Median 47 46 0.0000*** Age 
Std. Dev. 3.3058 3.3701 - 
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Mean 7.2393 6.7045 0.0014*** 
Median 7.3868 6.5164 0.0017*** Time 
Std. Dev. 3.3414 3.1752 - 
Mean 0.1117 0.1126 0.9536 
Median 0 0 0.9746 Switch 
Std. Dev. 0.3154 0.3162 - 
Mean 0.5152 0.3636 0.0000*** 
Median 1 0 0.0000*** In_Audit 
Std. Dev. 0.5004 0.4811 - 
Mean 0.4386 0.4315 0.5507 
Median 0.5 0.5 0.6910 Indp_Ratio 
Std. Dev. 0.2393 0.2284 - 
Mean 0.0152 0.0318 0.0660* 
Median 0 0 0.0661* Delisting 
Std. Dev. 0.1226 0.1755 - 
Mean 47.1966 41.2292 0.0000*** 
Median 47.8055 39.3600 0.0000*** No_1_Share 
Std. Dev. 16.0042 16.8207 - 
Mean 0.3832 0.5094 0.0000*** 
Median 0 1 0.0000*** Pfmc 
Std. Dev. 0.4868 0.5000 - 
Mean 6.6345 11.9721 0.0000*** 
Median 4 9 0.0000*** Institution 
Std. Dev. 6.7469 9.0191 - 
 
Notes: The ANOVA F-statistics for equality of means and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of the 
differences between medians are employed in Table 3. The p-values are reported. 
All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Heckman First-Step Probit Regression of Self-Selected Big 4 Auditors 
(Dependent Variable: Big_4) 
 
 Predicted Sign Coefficients Z-Statistics P-Value 
Explanatory Variables: 
Constant ? -15.5546*** -17.6698 0.0000 
In_Audit + 0.2721*** 4.2678 0.0000 
Assets + 0.6225*** 16.7324 0.0000 
Current_Ratio + 0.1514*** 4.4308 0.0000 
Leverage - -0.2901*** -3.0556 0.0022 
ROE + -0.1610 -1.3247 0.1853 
Loss - -0.1117 -0.8386 0.4017 
Receivables - -0.7006 -1.4857 0.1374 
Inventory - -0.6416** -2.2949 0.0217 
Prior_Opinion - -0.2686** -2.0055 0.0449 
B_Share + 0.7277*** 8.5966 0.0000 
Beta + 0.0929 0.5616 0.5744 
Fluctuations ? 0.3062*** 3.2415 0.0012 
Firm_Avg + 0.3752 1.3171 0.1878 
Institution - -0.0279*** -6.8189 0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared                                                                                                              0.2566         
Sample Size                                                                                                                          5268         
 
Note: All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
The z-statistics are reported to test for differences in proportion. 
The pseudo R-squared adopts the McFadden R-squared index to measure the goodness of fit of the 
model. 
The dependent variable and all explanatory variables are defined as in Table 2. 
The year and industry specifics are controlled but not reported for convenience. 
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Table 5. Heckman Second-Step Logit Regression of Opinion Prediction by Big 4    
Auditors                             (Dependent Variable: Opinion) 
 
Original Adjusted by Imills 
 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Explanatory Variables: 
Constant ? 1.1934 0.9172 153.8574** 0.0190 
Assets - -0.2395 0.6154 -6.0663** 0.0166 
Current_Ratio - 0.4903 0.1616 -0.9394 0.1568 
Leverage + -1.7558 0.3045 0.6394 0.7551 
ROE - -3.1686 0.2884 -2.3810 0.4711 
Loss + 4.5465*** 0.0012 5.5913*** 0.0012 
Receivables + 1.3053 0.7711 7.3084 0.1751 
Inventory + 3.7087 0.2212 12.5130** 0.0108 
Prior_Opinion + 5.8615*** 0.0000 8.7556*** 0.0000 
B_Share - -0.0038 0.9964 -6.3280** 0.0199 
Beta - -1.7164 0.3662 -1.9594 0.3697 
Fluctuations ? -1.3230 0.2753 -3.9822** 0.0351 
Firm_Avg - -6.4604 0.1278 -8.9253** 0.0446 
Institution + 0.0965* 0.0544 0.3645*** 0.0057 
Imills -   -11.7927** 0.0173 
Pseudo 2R  
Sample Size 
 0.6388 
394 
 0.6810 
394 
 
Notes: All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
The pseudo R-squared adopts the McFadden R-squared index to measure the goodness of fit of the 
model. 
The explanatory variable Imills represents the inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman self-selection 
model. The dependent variable and all other explanatory variables are defined as in Table 2. 
The year and industry specifics are controlled but not reported for convenience. 
 - 61 -    
Table 6. Audit Collusion Proxy Generation 
 
Panel A: Opinion Prediction Model for Big 4 Auditor Self-Prediction Results 
 
Opinion Prediction Model for Big 4 Auditor Self-Prediction Results: 
Predicted Opinion Actual Opinion Audit Collusion 
Opinion Number Percentage Opinion Number Percentage Collusion Number Percentage
1 17 4.61% 0 17 4.61% 1 18 4.57% 0 1 0.25% 1 1 0.25% 
1 7 1.78% 0 7 1.78% 0 376 95.43% 0 369 93.65% 0 369 93.65%
 
 
Panel B: Apply Opinion Prediction Model for Big 4 Auditors to Non-Big 4 Auditees 
 
Apply Opinion Prediction Model for Big 4 Auditors to Non-Big 4 Auditees: 
Predicted Opinion Actual Opinion Audit Collusion 
Opinion Number Percentage Opinion Number Percentage Collusion Number Percentage
1 219 4.49% 0 219 4.49% 1 409 8.39% 0 190 3.90% 1 190 3.90% 
1 252 5.17% 0 252 5.17% 0 4465 91.61% 0 4213 86.44% 0 4213 86.44%
 
Notes: The Opinion column represents a modified audit opinion when Opinion equals 1, and a 
clean audit opinion when Opinion equals 0. 
Collusion is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the predicted opinion is 1 but the actual opinion 
is 0. 
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Table 7. Logit Regression Results for Audit Collusion and SOEs 
(Dependent Variable: Collusion) 
 
 Coefficient 
(P-Value) 
(Model 1) 
Coefficient 
(P-Value) 
(Model 2) 
Coefficient 
(P-Value) 
(Model 3) 
Coefficient 
(P-Value) 
(Model 4) 
Independent Variables: 
Constant 90.3570*** 
(0.0000) 
89.8370*** 
(0.0000) 
89.3681*** 
(0.0000) 
90.4827*** 
(0.0000) 
SOE 0.5615** 
(0.0175)    
SOE*Pfmc  0.4852** (0.0211)   
SOE*(1-Pfmc)   -0.0221 (0.9336)  
SOE*No_1_Shar
e    
0.0112** 
(0.0110) 
Age -0.0246 
(0.4297) 
-0.0182 
(0.5518) 
-0.0058 
(0.8473) 
-0.0244 
(0.4330) 
Switch 0.3736 
(0.1349) 
0.3633 
(0.1461) 
0.3895 
(0.1175) 
0.3718 
(0.1387) 
Indp_Ratio -0.1550 
(0.7393) 
-0.1454 
(0.7542) 
-0.2206 
(0.6358) 
-0.1684 
(0.7191) 
Delisting -0.6894 
(0.1543) 
-0.6896 
(0.1527) 
-0.7262 
(0.1344) 
-0.7574 
(0.1204) 
Assets -3.7039*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.6850*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.6736*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.7131*** 
(0.0000) 
Current_Ratio -0.5104*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.4576*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.5180*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.5156*** 
(0.0019) 
Leverage 0.9657*** 
(0.0077) 
0.8715** 
(0.0187) 
1.0083*** 
(0.0057) 
1.0155*** 
(0.0049) 
ROE 0.9742*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9831*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0086*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9825*** 
(0.0000) 
Loss 4.4527*** 
(0.0000) 
4.3474*** 
(0.0000) 
4.4289*** 
(0.0000) 
4.4645*** 
(0.0000) 
Receivables 5.9223*** 
(0.0000) 
5.1517*** 
(0.0005) 
5.8793*** 
(0.0001) 
5.8128*** 
(0.0001) 
Inventory 9.3465*** 
(0.0000) 
9.0653*** 
(0.0000) 
9.3853*** 
(0.0000) 
9.3055*** 
(0.0000) 
Prior_Opinion 3.6036*** 
(0.0000) 
3.5912*** 
(0.0000) 
3.5613*** 
(0.0000) 
3.5883*** 
(0.0000) 
Time 0.0684* 
(0.0653) 
0.0680* 
(0.0679) 
0.0676* 
(0.0679) 
0.0801** 
(0.0335) 
B_share -3.3059*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.3157*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.2496*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.2884*** 
(0.0000) 
Beta -0.6430 
(0.1655) 
-0.5061 
(0.2792) 
-0.6282 
(0.1779) 
-0.6486 
(0.1618) 
Fluctuations 
 
-2.1676*** 
(0.0000) 
-2.1758*** 
(0.0000) 
-2.1498*** 
(0.0000) 
-2.1645*** 
(0.0000) 
Firm_Avg -3.7765*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.7517*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.7884*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.7704*** 
(0.0001) 
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Institution 0.2488*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2491*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2493*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2484*** 
(0.0000) 
Imills -7.3007*** 
(0.0000) 
-7.2860*** 
(0.0000) 
-7.3081*** 
(0.0000) 
-7.2757*** 
(0.0000) 
Pseudo 2R  
Sample Size 
0.4391 
4874 
0.4388 
4874 
0.4355 
4874 
0.4395 
4874 
 
Notes: All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
The pseudo R-squared adopts the McFadden R-squared index to measure the goodness of fit of the 
model. 
The dependent variable and all other explanatory variables are defined as in Table 2. 
The year and industry specifics are controlled but not reported for convenience. 
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Table 8. Logit Regression Results for Audit Collusion and Non-SOEs 
(Dependent Variable: Collusion) 
 
 Coefficient 
(P-Value) 
(Model 1) 
Coefficient 
(P-Value) 
(Model 2) 
Coefficient 
(P-Value) 
(Model 3) 
Coefficient 
(P-Value) 
(Model 4) 
Independent Variables: 
Constant 90.9185***
(0.0000) 
89.3491*** 
(0.0000) 
92.0677*** 
(0.0000) 
90.2895*** 
(0.0000) 
1-SOE -0.5615** 
(0.0175)    
(1-SOE)*Pfmc  -0.2789 (0.2863)   
(1-SOE)*(1-Pfmc)   -0.9844** (0.0220)  
(1-SOE)*No_1_Share    -0.0140** (0.0475) 
Age -0.0246 
(0.4297) 
-0.0110 
(0.7195) 
-0.0202 
(0.5115) 
-0.0184 
(0.5500) 
Switch 0.3736 
(0.1349) 
0.3902 
(0.1170) 
0.3629 
(0.1462) 
0.3785 
(0.1297) 
Indp_Ratio -0.1550 
(0.7393) 
-0.2034 
(0.6624) 
-0.1786 
(0.7021) 
-0.1854 
(0.6895) 
Delisting -0.6894 
(0.1543) 
-0.7045 
(0.1462) 
-0.7380 
(0.1284) 
-0.7215 
(0.1365) 
Assets -3.7039*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.6639*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.7590*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.6883*** 
(0.0000) 
Current_Ratio -0.5104***
(0.0020) 
-0.5294*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.4763*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.5161*** 
(0.0017) 
Leverage 0.9657*** 
(0.0077) 
1.0064*** 
(0.0052) 
0.9592*** 
(0.0085) 
0.9806*** 
(0.0066) 
ROE 0.9742*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9846*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0329*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9802*** 
(0.0000) 
Loss 4.4527*** 
(0.0000) 
4.4346*** 
(0.0000) 
4.4674*** 
(0.0000) 
4.4402*** 
(0.0000) 
Receivables 5.9223*** 
(0.0000) 
6.0171*** 
(0.0000) 
5.6090*** 
(0.0001) 
5.9067*** 
(0.0000) 
Inventory 9.3465*** 
(0.0000) 
9.4329*** 
(0.0000) 
9.2180*** 
(0.0000) 
9.3575*** 
(0.0000) 
Prior_Opinion 3.6036*** 
(0.0000) 
3.5685*** 
(0.0000) 
3.6140*** 
(0.0000) 
3.5906*** 
(0.0000) 
Time 0.0684* 
(0.0653) 
0.0680* 
(0.0664) 
0.0687* 
(0.0722) 
0.0648* 
(0.0809) 
B_share -3.3059***
(0.0000) 
-3.2671*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.2888*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.2872*** 
(0.0000) 
Beta -0.6430 
(0.1655) 
-0.6784 
(0.1434) 
-0.5131 
(0.2683) 
-0.6657 
(0.1504) 
Fluctuations 
 
-2.1676***
(0.0000) 
-2.1400*** 
(0.0000) 
-2.2134*** 
(0.0000) 
-2.1493*** 
(0.0000) 
Firm_Avg -3.7765***
(0.0000) 
-3.8240*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.6673*** 
(0.0000) 
-3.7504*** 
(0.0000) 
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Institution 0.2488*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2491*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2497*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2493*** 
(0.0000) 
Imills -7.3007***
(0.0000) 
-7.2758*** 
(0.0000) 
-7.4092*** 
(0.0000) 
-7.2934*** 
(0.0000) 
Pseudo 2R  
Sample Size 
0.4391 
4874 
0.4362 
4874 
0.4392 
4874 
0.4381 
4874 
 
Notes: All p-values are one tailed. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
The pseudo R-squared adopts the McFadden R-squared index to measure the goodness of fit of the 
model. 
The dependent variable and all other explanatory variables are defined as in Table 2. 
The year and industry specifics are controlled but not reported for convenience. 
 
 
 
 
